Can There Be a Theory of Law? by Raz, Joseph
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2007 
Can There Be a Theory of Law? 
Joseph Raz 
Columbia Law School, jr159@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Public Law and Legal 
Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph Raz, Can There Be a Theory of Law?, BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, 
MARTIN GOLDING & WILLIAM EDMUNDSON, EDS., BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2004 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1498 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010287
 
 
Can there be a  theory of  law?  
Joseph Raz 1  
 
“Why not?” you may ask. And indeed few challenge the possibility of theorising about 
the law, if that is taken to mean “engaging in theoretical debates” about the law. Yet the thought 
that there can be a theory of law, that is a set of systematically related true propositions about the 
nature of law, has been challenged, and from several directions. None of the challenges is entirely 
successful. But through examining some of them we gain a better understanding of what a theory 
of law can be, and how its success can be established.  
I will be using “a theory of law” in a narrow sense, as referring to an explanation of the 
nature of law. It is a sense central to philosophical reflection about the law throughout its history. 
But in choosing this narrow understanding of “theory of law” I do not mean to dispute the 
appropriateness of other theoretical investigations about the law, some of which I dabbled in 
myself on other occasions, nor to deny them the title of theories of law.2 My choice to use the 
term in the narrow sense explained here is purely a matter of terminological convenience. 
Therefore, as here understood a theory of law provides an account of the nature of law. 
The thesis I will be defending is that a theory of law is successful if it meets two criteria: First, it 
consists of propositions about the law which are necessarily true, and, second, they explain what 
the law is. 
All theories aim to be successful, or at least to be more successful than their rivals. To 
understand what theories are we need to understand what it would be for them to be successful, 
that is what it would be for them to be what they aim to be. When discussing what a legal theory 
is I will assume that we are concerned with understanding the character of wholly successful 
theories, that is of theories which meet the two conditions. Sections 2 and 3 of this paper will 
                                                     
1 Balliol College, Oxford and Columbia University, New York. This essay uses material and ideas 
included in my “On the Nature of Law”, Archiv f r Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 82 (1996) 1, 
and in “Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison”, Legal Theory 4 
(1998) 249. 
2  Notable among them are theories about the appropriate form or content that legal institutions 
should have, theories about the concepts and principle which govern various legal areas (property, 
commercial law, torts, contract, etc.). 
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discuss the two conditions. The first section aims to clarify the relationship between the thesis as 
stated above and the traditional way of understanding the task of legal theory as explaining the 
concept of law. The remaining sections (4 to 6) examine several difficulties to the idea that there 
can be a theory of law in general, a theory which since true is necessarily true of the law wherever 
and whenever it is to be found. The problem there examined arise out of the changing nature of 
concepts, out of the dependence of law on concepts, and out of the alleged impossibility of 
understanding alien cultures, using alien concepts. 
1. Essence and Concept 
What is the relation between the concept of a thing and its nature?  
Concepts, as objects of philosophical study, as the target of conceptual analysis or 
elucidation, are a philosophical creation.1 Here is an example of one non-philosophical use 
(quoted from the Oxford English Dictionary): 
Techniques of testing product concepts in advertising could conceivably become as 
important as new physical research techniques have been to the chemical and metals 
industries. (1970 C. Ramond in R. Barton Handbk. Advertising Managem. xxii. 19) 
Here “product concepts” means something like ideas about possible products. There is, however, 
a common core to the philosophical and non-philosophical uses. They related to how people 
conceive certain objects, or phenomena. 
Metaphorically speaking, concepts (and from now one I will confine myself to the 
philosophical use of the term, and will feel free to suggest emendations of it) are placed between 
the world, aspects of which they are concepts of, and words or phrases, which express them (the 
concepts) and are used to talk about those aspects of the world. Some writers exaggerate their 
proximity to words and phrases and identify them with word – or phrase meaning. Others 
associate them closely with the nature of their objects, the nature of what they are concepts of. 
When Ryle wrote about The Concept of Mind, or Hart The Concept of Law they meant, in 
advancing explanations of the concepts of mind and of law, to offer explanations of the nature of 
mind and of the law. Ryle opens his book saying: 
This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of the mind2 
Hart opens saying 
My aim in this book has been to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality 
as different but related social phenomena.3 
                                                     
1  Raz, 1998 #1 
2  The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson 1949) p. 9.  
3  The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP 1961) p. v. 
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For them as for many other philosophers there was no difference between an explanation of 
concepts and of the nature of things of which they are concepts. Some may even claim that there 
is no conflict between these two ways of understanding concepts, a view which dates back at least 
to the beginning of the century and the growth of “conceptual analysis” as a prime method of 
philosophical inquiry, which was often equated with analysis of the meanings of words and 
phrases. 
 The view I will advance allows that there is some truth in both approaches. But both are 
mistaken and misleading. Concepts are how we conceive aspects of the world, and lie between 
words and their meanings, in which they are expressed, on the one side, and the nature of things 
to which they apply, on the other. 
 The law offers an easy illustration of the non-identity of concepts and (word) meanings. 
Hart’s The Concept Of Law does not explain, nor does it aim to explain the meaning of the word 
“law”. It has nothing to say about divine law, mathematical or logical laws, laws of nature, nor 
many others. Nor do I think that it is a partial explanation of the meaning of the word. “Law” is 
not ambiguous, and The Concept of Law does not explain one of its meanings. When used in 
legal contexts “law” bears the same meaning as in other contexts. Nor is it plausible to think that 
its univocal meaning is explained by a list of alternatives, as if saying that “law” means what it 
means in legal contexts, OR what it means in religious contexts, OR what it means in 
mathematical contexts, etc. The word is used in all these contexts to refer to rules of some 
permanence and generality, giving rise to one kind of necessity or another.  
 Those who offer explanations of the concept of law usually do mean, as Hart did, to 
explain the nature of a familiar social institution. It would have been possible for a language to 
contain a word which refers to this social institution and to nothing else. It may be mere accident 
that we do not have such a word, though there are good historical-intellectual explanations why 
“law” has the meaning it has. But things being as they are the meaning of the expression “the 
law” is not (identical with) the concept of law which Hart, and other philosophers of law, sought 
to explain.  
Of course we express the concept, use it and refer to it by using words. But we need not 
use the word “law” or “the law” to refer to it. We could talk of the law by talking of the system of 
courts and legislature and the rules they endorse in a state, for example. And we could do so in a 
large number of other ways. Most importantly, we rely on context, linguistic and non-linguistic, 
to determine whether we are talking of the right sort of law when talking of law, or whether we 
are talking of scientific or other laws. The availability of context to determine reference 
establishes that there is no need for concepts to be identified by the use of specific words or 
phrases. 
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I will make two assumptions about concepts: First, I will assume that we can explain 
what they are by explaining what it is to have and understand them. That is, we explain a 
particular concept by setting out the conditions under which it is true of people that they have and 
understand that concept. Second, I will assume that concepts differ from each other by the 
information required to have and understand them, and by the skills and abilities involved in their 
possession. I call these assumptions, for in making them I am deviating from the ordinary 
meaning of “concepts”, narrowing it down, and fashioning it in accordance with the way it is 
normally used in philosophical writings. Normally, rather than always, for the philosophical use 
is not uniform, and because in any case we should keep the freedom to deviate from philosophical 
usage where it would make sense to do so. 
Those who, like Hart and Ryle, emphasise the close connection between concepts and the 
nature of things can be said to be implicitly committed to the view that a complete understanding 
of a concept consists in knowing and understanding all the necessary features of its object, that is 
of that of which it is a concept. I will follow them in equating complete mastery of a concept with 
knowledge and understanding of all the necessary features of the objects to which it applies. 
Thus, complete mastery of the concept of a table consists in knowledge and understanding of all 
the essential properties of tables, and so on. 
Is it an objection to this view that complete mastery of one concept can be identical with 
complete mastery of another without the two concepts being identical? Not necessarily. It is an 
objection only if we individuate concepts by the conditions for their complete mastery. Let me 
explain. 
The concepts of an equilateral triangle and of an equiangular triangle are not the same 
concepts, but the necessary features of equilateral triangles are the same as those of equiangular 
ones. The necessary features of the one kind of triangle are the same as the necessary features of 
the other. We can accept that complete mastery of these concepts involves knowing that they 
apply to the same triangles, knowledge that the conditions for their complete mastery are the 
same. But they apply to the same triangles in different ways, for different reasons, the one 
because they are equilateral, while the other because they are equiangular.  
How does this difference manifest itself? Primarily by the fact that concepts are 
individuated not merely by the conditions for their complete mastery, but also by the minimal 
conditions for having them. One may have the concept of an equilateral triangle without realising 
that it is part of the nature of such triangles to be equiangular. Admittedly, one’s understanding of 
the concept will then be incomplete. But then the notion of complete understanding, as explained 
above, is very demanding. Most of the concepts we have and understand we master and 
understand incompletely. What one cannot fail to know, if one has the concept of equilateral 
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triangles, is that the concept applies to and only to triangles with equal sides. This is where the 
two concepts (of equilateral and equiangular triangle, in the example) differ. They differ in the 
minimal conditions for their possession. For, of course, someone who does not know that the 
concept of equiangular triangles applies only to triangles with equal sides may still have (an 
incomplete mastery of) that concept. But if he does not know that they apply and to all and only 
triangles of equal angles then he does not have the concept at all.  
Following this line of thought I will maintain that an explanation of a concept has four 
parts:  
1) Setting the condition for the knowledge involved in complete mastery of the 
concept, which is the knowledge of all the essential features of the thing it is a 
concept of. 
2) Explaining the understanding involved in complete mastery of the concept. 
3) Explaining the conditions for minimal possession of the concept, that is those, 
essential or non-essential, properties of what the concept is a concept of, 
knowledge of which is necessary for the person to have the concept at all, 
however incomplete his or her mastery of it may be. 
4) Explaining the abilities required for minimal possession of the concept.1 
The first condition determines what the concept is a concept of. But all of them together 
determine the identity of the concept. 
As with other aspects of this inquiry my use of “minimal conditions for the possession of 
a concept” is partly responsive to our normal notions, and partly a stipulative regimentation of 
these notions. It allows that people may know things about concepts, while not having these 
concepts. One may know that N is an animal without having the concept of N. One may know 
that mauve is a colour without having the concept, or that snakes lay eggs without having the 
concept of a snake. As this last example shows, knowledge that is inadequate for even minimal 
                                                     
1  In the present paper I will not dwell on the role of understanding ability in concept possession. My 
assumption is that understanding consists in knowing important relations among the essential 
properties of the things the concepts apply to, and among them and some other properties. I 
mention skill and abilities to indicate that for possession of a concept the verbal or conceptual 
abilities which manifest themselves in giving explanations of the concept or its use are not 
sufficient. It requires some non-verbal skills or abilities as well, abilities which manifest 
themselves in its correct use, rather than in any explanation of it.  
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possession of a concept may be knowledge those who have mastered the concept (incompletely) 
may not have.  
The mention of knowledge of non-essential properties as among the possible conditions 
for minimal possession of the concept is meant to allow that people may have knowledge which is 
sufficient to enable them to use the concept correctly in the circumstances of their life, but which 
is not true of it in all conditions. They may rely on the fact that swans that they have come across 
are white as crucial to their ability to identify swans. That may be part of what would justify 
judging them as having the concept.1 
These considerations allow that people can refer to concepts which they do not possess. 
But this seems obvious for independent reasons as well. Reference to a concept need not employ 
any of its necessary features. For example, given that yesterday my friends discussed the concept 
of cruelty I can refer to it as the concept my friends discussed yesterday. I need know nothing 
more about it to successfully refer to it. They also allow that people may possess a concept and 
yet fail to recognise that it is identical with another, or think that there is only one, where there 
are two (the minimal conditions for the possession of the concepts of WATER and of TWATER 
are the same, though the concepts are not identical since the conditions for their complete mastery 
differ). 
It is possible for any person to invent, or develop a new concept. Some concepts which 
emerge in that way make their way into the general culture, usually more or less modified along 
the way. But for the most part concepts exist independently of any one of their users. For the most 
part, we learn concepts, rather than invent or develop them. It must be so. Given the richness of 
                                                     
1  Note that not all essential properties are used in identifying instances or occurrences of the things 
they are essential properties of. Some essential properties are useless for identificatory purposes. It 
may be an essential property of real tennis that it is the ball game first developed in France in the 
14th century, but normally you cannot identify a game of real tennis as being that by reference to 
that property. Furthermore, properties which can be used for identification often are not essential 
properties. Possibly the only essential property of water is that it is H2O. But few people use that 
to identify water. Finally, often we rely on non-essential properties to identify instances of 
concepts. They may be reliable marks of instances of the concept in all normal circumstances. 
Note also that there is no reason to suppose the same property is used to identify items falling 
under the concept by everyone who has the concept. Some essential properties may be used in this 
way by some people, and not be used, indeed not be even known to others who nevertheless have 
mastered the concept some other way. 
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our concepts and the limits of our abilities it is not possible for anyone to invent or modify more 
than a fractional margin of them. Given their role in communication it would be self-defeating to 
do so. The fact that for the most part concepts are there independently of any one of us does not 
mean of course that they are independent of us collectively. The conditions fixing the identity of 
particular concepts are idealisations constructed out of our conceptual practices, i.e. out of the use 
of those concepts in general. They need not reflect any individual's practice. While it is 
impossible for a concept that no one knows anything about to exist, it is possible that no one has a 
completely correct understanding or knowledge of a concept, or indeed of any concept, including 
the concept of a concept.  
Furthermore, while the conditions for concept possession are what they are because of 
our conceptual practices, it does not follow that we can identify the concept an individual uses, or 
intends to use, except by reference to our knowledge of what concepts there are. In part this is due 
to the fact that, with rare exceptions, when people use a concept, or try to, they intend to use a 
concept that is there (the one normally expressed by the word they use, etc.). Identification of 
intentions generally depends on (defeasible) presumptions of normality invoked by their 
manifestations (if you walk to the door then you intend to do so, unless some circumstances 
defeating the presumption obtain; if you say "I will open the door" then you mean what is 
normally meant when the sentence is uttered in like circumstances, unless some circumstances 
defeating the presumption obtain). Similarly, when you utter words to express a concept you 
express the concept that would normally be used when those words are uttered in those 
circumstances, unless defeating conditions obtain. Knowledge of the concept is presupposed in 
identifying the use of a concept. The speaker's intention to use the concept is identified by 
reference to presumptions of normality which presuppose such knowledge. 
The preceding remarks show (a) how people can have incomplete understanding of 
concepts they possess, (b) how they can make mistakes about such concepts, including (c) 
mistakes about the identity of the concepts they possess and use. 
These sketchy and rather dogmatically stated remarks were meant to explain why 
explaining a concept is close to explaining the nature of what it is a concept of (see the first 
condition of concept identity above), and yet why the two tasks differ (see the other conditions). 
They also explain why I regard the explanation of the nature of law as the primary task of the 
theory of law. That the explanation of the concept of law is one of its secondary tasks is a result 
of the fact that part of the task of explaining the nature of law is to explain how people perceive 
the law, and therefore, where the law exists in a country whose population has the concept of law, 
it becomes relevant to know whether the law is affected by its concept. 
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2. Can the law change its nature? 
A theory consists of necessary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the 
nature of the law. We talk of “the nature of law”, or the nature of anything else, to refer to those 
of the law’s characteristics which are of the essence of law, which make law into what it is. That 
is those properties without which the law would not be law. As the Oxford English Dictionary 
explains, the nature of a thing consists of 
the essential qualities or properties of a thing; the inherent and inseparable combination of 
properties essentially pertaining to anything and giving it its fundamental character.  
Naturally, the essential properties of the law are universal characteristics of law. They are 
to be found in law wherever and whenever it exists. Moreover, these properties are universal 
properties of the law not accidentally, and not because of any prevailing economic or social 
circumstances, but because there is no law without them. This does not mean that there are no 
social institutions, or normative systems, which share many of the law’s characteristics, but do 
not have the essential properties of the law. When surveying the different forms of social 
organisation in different societies throughout the ages we will find many which resemble the law 
in various ways. Yet if they lack the essential features of the law, they are not legal systems. 
This way of looking at the question may give rise to the suspicion that something has 
gone wrong right at the beginning of the inquiry. It seems to presuppose something which is 
plainly false. It presupposes that law has - indeed that it must have - an unchanging nature. But 
is not that a mistake? Surely - the objection runs - the nature of the law changes. Think of the 
law and the legal cultures of the Roman Empire, of European countries during feudalism, or in 
the age of absolutism. “Law” had different meanings during these different periods, and the 
modern Western notion of law differs from all of them. What was essential to the law of one 
period was absent in the law of another period. A theory of law which overlooks these facts 
cannot be a good theory. 
But can the law change its nature? No doubt the law of any country can change, and does 
change. Moreover the institutions and practices of a country which constitute its law may lose the 
properties which are essential to the law. If that happens the result is not that the law changes its 
nature, but that the country no longer has a legal system (though it may have an institution which 
is not unlike the law in some or even many respects). 
How do I know that the nature of law cannot change? That is a misconceived question. 
Following a well established philosophical practice, I am using the term “the nature of law” and 
related terms such as “essential properties” to designate those properties which any (system of) 
law must possess to be law. This practice deviates from the way “the nature of” is sometimes used 
in non-philosophical English. But it is important not to get hung up on terminological questions. 
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The question is whether the law has essential properties, thus understood. And if it does, does 
understanding them enjoy a special role in understanding what the law is? 
This reply to the objection that the inquiry is based on a false presupposition is not the 
end of the matter. It leads directly to a new criticism. It leads to a charge of arbitrariness, a charge 
of arbitrary verbal legislation which obscures important points. The use of “essential properties” 
and of “nature” which I propose to follow obscures the fact that in reality the nature of law 
changes with time, and therefore it obstructs rather than helps the development of a theoretical or 
philosophical account of law. 
There is something right, as well as something wrong, in this objection. As has already 
been admitted, the use of “essential properties” and of “the nature of ...” which I briefly 
delineated is not the only use these terms have. It is perfectly in order, indeed true, to say that 
with the rise of capitalism the nature of the State has undergone a profound change. Or to say that 
the absolute protection of property and contract has become an essential function of the State. 
“The nature of X”, in other words, is often used to refer to properties of X which are taken to be 
of great importance, even though they are not definitive of the identity of X, i.e., even though X 
will not cease being what it is without them. It will merely undergo radical change.  
When Jeremiah asks “Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?” 
(Jeremiah, 13:23) is he assuming that the change is metaphysically impossible or conceptually 
inconceivable (for he thinks that a spotless leopard is no leopard, etc.) or just that it is impossible 
as a matter of fact? There is no answer to the question. In most communication and thought the 
distinction is rarely drawn, nor is there any reason to draw it. It is not surprising, however, that 
the distinction is of philosophical importance. Therefore it is not surprising that philosophers have 
established a technical meaning for the terms, and I will follow it. Doing so does not prejudge the 
questions: does the law have a nature, in that sense of the word? And if so, is it illuminating to 
investigate it? It is true, of course, that there is no point in using this philosophical terminology 
unless the answer to these questions is affirmative. The only point I have been arguing for so far 
is that the fact that the notions of essential properties, and of the nature of something, are 
philosophical notions does not in itself disqualify them, nor does it in itself impugn the enquiry 
into the nature of law. 
3. Does the law have essential properties? 
It is time to return to the argument: Defining the object of a theory of law as a search for 
an explanation of the nature of law threatens to lead to its immediate abandonment, for it raises an 
obvious objection to the enterprise. I have conceded that it is part of our common understanding 
of the law that its nature (when that word is understood as it usually is) changes over time, both 
with changes in social and political practices, and with changes in culture, in philosophy or more 
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generally, in ways of understanding ourselves and our societies. Does not that show not only that 
the philosophical notion of the nature of a thing or of its essential properties is absent from our 
common discourse, but also that it has no application, or at least that it does not apply to the law? 
If this is so then by setting itself the goal of accounting for the nature of law legal theory 
condemns itself to inevitable failure. The argument that this is indeed the fate of legal theory so 
understood is simple: Over time we have been happy to operate without the philosophical 
distinction between essential and non-essential properties, so that whenever changes in the 
character of the law or in our ideas or ways of understanding it so required we changed our 
concept of law. And this was true of any changes, however great. Does this not show that the 
thought that the law has a fixed nature is an illusion? 
As it happens this argument is not a good one. It is not generally the case that belief that 
something has essential properties is a precondition of it having such properties. If being made of 
H2O is of the nature of water then this is so whether or not people believe that it is so, and 
whether or not they believe that water has essential properties. More specifically, what counts is 
not the common understanding of expressions like “the nature of law”, nor even the fact that the 
concept of law changes over time. What counts is the nature of the institution which the concept 
of law (i.e. the one we currently have and use) designates. To make its case the objection has to 
show that our concept of law (as it is at the moment) does not allow for the application of the 
(philosophical) notion of essential properties to the law, that is that the law has no essential 
properties. 
Prima facie the evidence points against the objection. It is part of our understanding of 
the law that certain social institutions are instances of law whereas others are non-legal.1 The 
distinction between the legal and the non-legal is part and parcel of those of our practices which 
determine the concept of law. We know that the regulations of a golf club are not a legal system, 
and that independent states have legal systems. I know that an Act of the British Parliament is 
legally binding, but a resolution of my neighbours to deny any non-resident access to our street 
has no legal validity. And so on. Moreover, while the distinction is not marked by the presence of 
the same linguistic cues, it is fairly stable, used by lawyers, politicians, bureaucrats, and lay 
people, in a whole variety of contexts, always in the same way, always referring to the same set of 
practices and institutions. Indeed some may add that the very talk of ‘changes occurring in the 
                                                     
1 Here and in the sequel I will use “law”, as it is often used, to refer sometimes to a legal system, 
and sometimes to a rule of law, or a statement of how the law is on a particular point. Sometimes I 
will use the word ambiguously to refer to one or the other of these, as it does not matter for the 
purposes of the discussion of this chapter which way it is understood. 
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concept of law’ shows that once such changes occur it is no longer the same concept. It is a case 
of a new concept replacing the old one though they happen to share the same term.1 Rather than 
challenging the thought that the law is marked by essential properties talk of a change in the 
concept seems to confirm the thought, it seems to presuppose it. 
This can be seen, of course, as a trivial point. The understanding of a concept includes an 
understanding of what determines what falls under the concept and what does not. In itself this 
does not show that the law has essential properties, that is, properties without which there can be 
no law. As we are often reminded the concept of law may be a family resemblance concept.2 Not 
all the items designated by a family resemblance concept share a common property, and ipso 
facto they do not have essential properties. 
I believe that the news of family resemblance concepts has been much exaggerated. A 
family resemblance concept is meant to be an unstructured concept. It applies to some instances 
in virtue of their possession of a set of features, say A,B,C, to other instances it applies in virtue 
of a different, partly overlapping, set of features, say B,C,D, to others still in virtue of a set of 
features still further removed from the instances we started with, say C,D,E, and so on. I doubt 
that many concepts are of this kind. Elsewhere I have argued that the concept of a game, a 
                                                     
1 Compare a different case: the way the meaning of “knight” changed in the Middle Ages. “Knight” 
the Oxford English dictionary explains means (among other things:  
“3. ..: A military servant or follower (of a king or some other specified superior); later, one 
devoted to the service of a lady as her attendant, or her champion in war or the tournament; .. 
This is logically the direct predecessor of sense 4, the ‘king’s knight’ having become the ‘knight’ 
par excellence, and a lady’s knight being usually one of knightly rank.  
4. Name of an order or rank. a. In the Middle Ages: Originally (as in 3), A military servant of the 
king or other person of rank; a feudal tenant holding land from a superior on condition of serving 
in the field as a mounted and well-armed man. In the fully-developed feudal system: One raised to 
honourable military rank by the king or other qualified person, the distinction being usually 
conferred only upon one of noble birth who had served a regular apprenticeship (as page and 
squire) to the profession of arms, and thus being a regular step in this even for those of the highest 
rank.”  
No one would deny that changes of meaning of this kind occur, but while there is no harm in 
referring to them as changes in the concept of a knight there is no reason to regard them as 
anything other than a case in which one concept has replaced another. 
2 Some  regard the fact that law is a vague concept as another reason for denying that it makes sense 
to talk of the essential properties of law. We will discuss vagueness later in the book. 
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paradigm of a family resemblance concept, is not a family resemblance concept after all.1 While 
the meaning of many terms in natural languages cannot be given by a set of properties essential to 
their application, they usually have a core meaning with a structured set of extensions. This is 
why “root” can be used to refer to the root of the question, or “school” to a school of thought. 
Up to a point this debate is beside the point, beside our point. The notion of a family 
resemblance was developed by Wittgenstein in an argument against too regimented a way of 
accounting for the meanings of words and expressions. But the essential properties of law which 
legal theory is trying to give an account of are not invoked to account for the meaning of any term 
or class of terms. We are inquiring into the typology of social institutions, not into the semantics 
of terms. We build a typology of institutions by reference to properties we regard, or come to 
regard, as essential to the type of institution in question.  
The distinction between inquiring into the meaning of terms and into the nature of 
institutions is often lost on legal theorists, perhaps in part because social institutions depend on 
the existence of complex practices including practices which can be broadly called linguistic, i.e. 
practices of discussing certain matters by reference to aspects of these institutions. By 
coincidence it could happen that there is a term or more than one which derive their meanings 
exclusively from their employment to designate a central aspect of a particular social institution. 
In such a case the tasks of explaining the nature of the institution and explaining the meaning of 
the terms will be closely allied. Fortunately this is not the case with “law”. While legal scholars 
sometimes write as if they think that the term is exclusively used to refer to the law of states, and 
courts, etc. the truth is otherwise. “Law” is employed in relation to sciences, grammar, logic, 
language, and many other areas. Moreover, while the law, i.e. the law as we are interested in it, is 
replete with technical terms (“fee simple”, “intestate”, etc.) and other ordinary terms are used 
within the law with a technical meaning (“shares”, “bonds”, “equity”) these are terms specific to 
one legal system or to a type of legal system. The general terminology of the law is no more 
specific to it than the word “law” itself. It consists of terms like “person”, “status”, “property”, 
rights”, “duties”, which are part of the common terminology of practical discourse in general.2  
                                                     
1 Practical Reason and Norms, ch. 
2 It is not clear whether any philosopher of any stature ever supposed otherwise. Bentham’s account 
is accompanied by a penetrating analysis of the semantic explanation of normative terms (see Of 
Law in General , and Hart,  Essays on Bentham ). But its purpose is to show that his account of 
the law is semantically legitimate. It does not establish that he thought of it as an explanation of 
the meaning of the word ‘law’ in English. Clearly Hart never meant to offer a semantic analysis of 
the word law Concept of Law, ch.1. It is strange that R.M. Dworkin who did not make the 
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Not only is the general terminology used to talk about the law common to practical 
discourse generally, but there is no single way in which we always mark that it is the lawyer’s law 
that we have in mind when we talk of people’s rights and duties, about what they are entitled to 
do or required to do, of benefits they enjoy or liabilities or risks they are subject to. Sentences of 
these kinds and many others can be used to assert how things are according to law, or how they 
are morally, or by the customs of the place, and so on. It is always possible to clarify which 
statement is made by prefacing one’s words with “according to law” or by other devices. But 
most commonly we leave it to the context to clarify what exactly is being stated, (and, of course, 
often we prefer not to disambiguate our meaning). It follows from these observations that while in 
the course of giving an account of the nature of law one may well engage in explaining the 
meaning of certain terms, the explanation of the nature of law cannot be equated with an analysis 
of the meaning of any term. 
What then is an account of the nature of law, of its essential properties? We are trying, I 
have suggested, to explain the nature of a certain kind of social institution. This suggests that the 
explanation is part of the social sciences, and that it is guided or motivated by the considerations 
which guide theory construction in the social sciences. In a way this is true, but this way of 
making the point may encourage a misguided understanding of the enterprise. It makes it sound 
as if some abstract theoretical considerations determine the classification of social institutions, 
considerations like theoretical fruitfulness, simplicity of presentation, deductive or computational 
simplicity, or elegance.  
Considerations like these may indeed be relevant when a classification, a typology or a 
concept is introduced by academics for the purpose of facilitating their research or the 
presentation of its results. The notion of law as designating a type of social institution is not, 
however, part of the scholarly apparatus of any learned discipline. It is not a concept introduced 
by academics to help with explaining some social phenomena. Rather it is a concept entrenched in 
our society’s self-understanding. It is a common concept in our society and one which is not the 
preserve of any specialised discipline. It is used by each and all of us to mark a social institution 
                                                                                                                                                              
mistake himself thought that Hart and many others are guilty of it. For my own previous 
repudiations of this view see EPD chapter on the Problem about the Nature of Law, among other 
places. Many other philosophers of law were less sensitive to the issue and did not discuss it 
directly. Yet the general character of their work would suggest that they did not think of 
themselves as providing a semantic analysis of the word ‘law’. It would be strange to attribute 
such a view to Hobbes, or to Locke, or Kant or Hegel, for example). 
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with which we are all, in various ways, and to various degrees, familiar. It occupies a central role 
in our understanding of society, our own as well as other societies. 
In large measure what we study when we study the nature of law is the nature of our own 
self-understanding. The identification of a certain social institution as law is not introduced by 
sociologists, political scientists, or some other academics as part of their study of society. It is part 
of the self-consciousness of our society.certain institutions as legal. And that consciousness is 
part of what we study when we inquire into the nature of law.  
But why should we? Is it not our aim to study the nature of law, rather than our culture 
and its concept of law? Yes and No. We aim to improve our understanding of the nature of law. 
The law is a type of social institution, the type which is picked up - designated - by the concept 
of law. Hence in improving our understanding of the nature of law we assume an understanding 
of the concept of law, and improve it. 
4. Parochial or Universal? 
At this point a new objection may be raised. Does not the fact that we study the nature of 
an institution which is picked out by our concept of law make the inquiry parochial rather than 
universal? Talk of the concept of law really means our concept of law. As has already been 
mentioned, the concept of law changes over time. Different cultures have different concepts of 
law. There is no one concept of law, and when we refer to the concept of law we just mean our 
concept. Therefore, to the extent that the inquiry is limited to the nature of law as understood in 
accordance with our concept of it it is a parochial study of an aspect of our culture rather than a 
universal study of the nature of law as such. Far from coming together, as has been suggested 
above, the study of the nature of law as such and of our self-understanding (in as much as it is 
encapsulated in our concept of law) are inimical to each other. Some people may develop the 
point further to the conclusion that there is no such thing as “the nature of law as such”. To claim 
otherwise is to commit the mistake of essentialism, or of objectification. Others would merely 
conclude that the study of the nature of the thing (the law) and of our concept of it are not as 
closely related as has been suggested above, and that one must choose which one to pursue. 
Common though this line of thought is, it is misguided. Think of it: we and other cultures 
have different concepts; not only different concepts of law. What makes some of them alternative 
concepts of law, whereas others are concepts of government, religion, tribes, or whatever but not 
of law? What accounts for the difference? What makes a concept “the so and so concept of 
law”(e.g. “the medieval concept of law”)? Ignoring the occasions on which “the concept of ...” is 
used to refer to the common opinions which people held about the law (the medieval concept of 
law being the views about the law, its role and function, common in medieval Europe) different 
concepts of law are concepts of law in virtue of their relations to our concept of law. Most 
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commonly these are relations of similarity (X’s concept of law is a concept of a social institution 
very much like, though not quite the same as, what we understand by law), or of a common origin 
(our concept of law developed out of the medieval concept, etc.). The point to note is that it is our 
concept which calls the shots: other concepts are concepts of law if and only if they are related in 
appropriate ways to our concept. 
Let us accept that what we are really studying is the nature of institutions of the type 
designated by the concept of law. These institutions are to be found not only in our society, but in 
others as well. While the concept of law is parochial, i.e. not all societies have it, our inquiry is 
universal in that it explores the nature of law, wherever it is to be found. Even so the charge of 
parochialism is liable to reappear in a new form. Is it not the case that the institution of law is to 
be found only in societies which have the concept of law (i.e. our concept of law)? Since it has 
been allowed earlier that the concept of law as we know it has developed in the West in modern 
times, and is certainly far from a universal feature of human civilisation, a theory of law which 
concentrates on the nature of law, in the sense explained above, is relevant to modern Western 
societies only. It may be universal in a formal sense. In the philosophically stipulated sense of 
“the nature of law” the inquiry applies to all the legal systems which ever existed or that could 
exist. But this way - my imagined objector goes on to say - of rebutting the charge of 
parochialism is a pyrrhic rebuttal. The inquiry, when successful, is universally valid for a narrow 
concept of law, the modern western concept of law. It is relevant not to all legal systems, as the 
term is usually - and non-philosophically - understood, which include the law of the Aztecs, of 
the countries of medieval Europe, of the Roman Empire, or of China in the 5th century B.C. and 
so on. The philosophical inquiry would have to exclude those, as they do not conform to the 
modern, capitalist, or post-industrial, concept of law.  
Put in this form the objection is based on a mistaken understanding of our concept of law. 
One way in which it has been changing over the last 2-3 centuries is to make it more inclusive 
and less parochial. As our knowledge of history and of the world has expanded, and as our 
interest in history, and our interaction with other parts of the world have become more extensive, 
the concept of law has developed to be more inclusive. Admittedly, it responds not only to our 
interest in other societies, but also to our understanding of ourselves and our society, and the two 
may conflict. Features which seem to us central in ourselves and in our society may be lacking in 
other societies. Their importance to us in our societies tends to encourage forging more parochial 
concepts. To some this factor appears to be the only or the dominant factor influencing our 
concepts. This leads to further (or reformulated) objections to the universalist ambition of 
philosophical theories. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 15 
J. Raz, Can There be a Theory of Law?  
Some theorists take parochialism in their stride and allow it to fashion their theories. The 
outstanding example of a legal theory of this kind is R.M. Dworkin’s. From the beginning he 
saw his theory as a theory of the law of the US and of the UK. Of course it may be true of other 
legal systems as well. But it is not its declared ambition to be universal.1 One reason elaborated 
by Dworkin in justification of this modest ambition is the fact that the concept of law is part of 
the practice of law.2 Dworkin has pointed out that courts of law are sometimes confronted with 
issues which force them to reflect about the nature and boundaries of the law. They may refer to 
philosophical theories in answering these questions, and their answers and arguments buttressing 
them are on a par with philosophical discussions of these issues. This is not to say that their 
answers and discussions are as good as philosophical theories. They may be better or worse. The 
point is that they are engaged in the same enterprise as philosophers. Their conclusions rival 
philosophical conclusions: if they disagree then one is wrong and the other may be right.  
It is tempting to reinforce the point just made by adding that while often courts will not 
attend to theoretical disputes about the nature of law since nothing in contention between the 
parties turns (or was claimed to turn) on disagreements about the nature of law, nevertheless any 
court’s decision presupposes some view or other about the nature of law. This seems to me to go 
beyond what the evidence warrants. The fact that if challenged to defend an action of mine I will 
have to advance theoretical arguments does not establish that I already have a theoretical view of 
one kind or another. I may have none, not even implicitly, and I may not be committed to any.3 
One cannot infer that a person has certain beliefs, or beliefs of a certain description, just because 
he should have them. And while the courts may be committed to the view that there is some way 
of justifying their decisions, they are not committed to any view about which way justification 
lies. 
It is wiser, therefore, not to reinforce the observation that the courts sometimes engage in 
a theoretical argument about the nature of law with the further point that all their decisions 
presuppose a view about the nature of law. The observation itself, however, is correct and beyond 
                                                     
1 These comments are offered as an interpretation of a point on which Dworkin’s views are not 
altogether clear. 
2 R.M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1986), ch.1. 
3 This matter turns in part on the pragmatic character of explanation (including justificatory 
explanations) which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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dispute.1 What lessons should we learn from them? Dworkin suggests that this establishes that 
law and legal philosophy are part of the same, self-reflective, practice. This implies that American 
legal philosophy is part of American law, that legal philosophy when studied in an American 
university is related to legal philosophy as studied in Italy in the same way that property law 
studied in an American university relates to property law studied in Italy. They are studies of 
analogous parts of the law, but are basically very different enterprises: an account of property 
law, or an aspect of it may be true of Italy and false of the USA. Similarly a theory about the 
nature of law may be true of the USA, but false of Italy. If it is true of both countries this is a 
contingent result of some historical developments which could have been otherwise. Theories of 
law, in other words, are necessarily parochial. 
Whether or not they are parochial, this argument does not prove that they are. Perhaps it 
is no exaggeration to say that any issue, from astrophysics to economics to Biblical exegesis, can 
be relevant to some legal decision or another. This would not show that any of those studies are 
part of American law in America and of Chinese law in China. The fact that a certain theoretical 
issue is material to a court’s decision would only show that the court should aim to get the matter 
right, to learn from the discipline concerned how things stand in the matter at issue. It does not 
show that by engaging in economic, sociological or biblical arguments courts can change the 
conclusions of those disciplines, that the fact that they come to some conclusion in these areas 
makes those conclusions true in economics or sociology, etc. Nor will this conclusion change if in 
some country or another once a court has taken a decision based on such grounds it would not be 
open to challenge on the ground that it got its economics, etc., wrong.  
All this is plain enough, but is it not different with legal theory? While the courts have no 
special authority in economics or political science, do they not have special authority regarding 
the concept of law? The answer is that it depends. Consider, by way of analogy, the same 
question raised about the notion of an undertaking. A case may turn on whether or not one person 
undertook to perform a service for another. Has the law authority to decide what counts as 
undertaking to do something? Yes and no. The courts have authority to decide when the law of 
their country would view an action as a binding undertaking. But the notion of an undertaking has 
life outside the law. And the court has no authority to decide what is an undertaking in that sense. 
I do not mean to say that it is precluded from forming a view on the matter, or from relying on 
that view. It may be required by law to form such a view since the plaintiff in a case may be 
                                                     
1 During the 60s countries of the British Commonwealth saw a series of decisions regarding the 
validity of coup d’état, secession and the like which took the courts deep into theoretical disputes, 
leading in turn to a spate of theoretical discussions in the journals. 
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entitled to relief only if the defendant has undertaken (in the ordinary sense of the word) to 
perform a service for him. The point I am urging is that if the court gets this wrong its decision 
would not change the nature of undertakings, any more than if it gets an economic argument 
wrong its decision can change economic theory. 
If things look differently in the case of an undertaking than in economics this is because a 
mistaken decision of the court may be the first step towards the emergence of a special technical 
sense of undertaking in the legal system concerned. That may be so even if the court did not mean 
it that way, even if it meant simply to find out what is an undertaking in the ordinary sense of the 
word. It is the same with the concept of law as it is with the concept of an undertaking. Of course, 
unlike the concept of an undertaking the concept of law applies only to the law. But like the 
concept of an undertaking it is a common concept in our culture which applies not only to our law 
but to the law of other countries, now as well as in the past or the future. It also applies to law in 
fiction, and in hypothetical cases. In short it is not a concept regarding which the courts have 
special authority. When a decision turns on a correct elucidation of the concept the courts try to 
get it right, as they do when it is about an undertaking, or about an economic argument. If they 
fail this may lead to the emergence of a technical sense for the term in that legal system. But it 
will not lead to a change in the notion of law. The claim that a theory of law is parochial for legal 
theory is part of legal practice is misguided. Legal theory is not part of legal practice, at least not 
in the sense required to establish its parochial nature. 
5. Can there be Law without The Concept of Law? 
Another argument for the parochial nature of legal theory turns on the claim that there is 
no law in a society which does not have the concept of law. Since I have admitted that the 
concept of law (that is our concept of law) is parochial and that not all societies which had law 
also had our concept of law, it follows that not all of them had institutions recognised as law by 
our concept. A theory of law which aims to explain the nature of the institutions and practices 
which our concept of law recognises as law is therefore only nominally universal. It applies to all 
that our concept recognises as law, but our concept fails to recognise as law many legal systems 
for the reason that they did not have our concept of law, and there is no law without the concept 
of law. 
We have to distinguish two versions of the argument. One claims that there cannot be law 
in a society which does not have a concept of law. According to it societies which do have some 
concept of law can have institutions and practices which are clear instances of the concept of law 
(as we have it). The other, more radical version claims that only societies which have our concept 
of law can have institutions and practices which are instances of the concept of law that we have. 
To make its conclusion good the radical version of the objection has to show that no society 
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which does not have our concept of law can have a legal system, as that institution is understood 
by our concept. That is an unlikely claim, which can be easily refuted by example, by simply 
pointing to some far away society, say that of Egypt in the 4th Century B.C., which did not have 
our concept of law, but had the institutions which that concept recognsises as legal. 
Even the weaker claim: that there cannot be law in a society which does not have some 
concept of law, is probably mistaken. The rest of this section is devoted to an examination of this 
weaker claim. Remember the following three theses: 
First, that the concept of law (our concept) is local in the sense that while some societies have it, 
others do not. 
Second, that there is no law in a society which does not have a concept of law (though it need not 
have our concept). 
Third, that a successful theory of law, being a correct account of a type of institution designated 
by a concept of law, applies only to institutions which prevail in cultures which possess 
the concept of law which designates the type of institution the theory explains.  
Together they lead to the conclusion that there are many valid theories of law, each applicable to 
a different type of social institution, picked out by a different concept of law. A theory of the 
institutions picked out by our concept of law applies only to the law in societies which have (or 
had) our concept of law.  
I have already endorsed the first of these propositions. We undermine the strong version 
of the argument by rejecting the third premise. To refute the weak version one has to show that 
there is no reason to accept the second premise. Undermining the second premise also undermines 
the third, which presupposes it. So let us examine the second premise, and with it the conclusion 
that legal theory understood as the study of the nature of the institutions identified as law by the 
(i.e. our) concept of law is valid only of legal systems equipped with some concept of law. I will 
argue that it is not the case that only a society with a concept of law can be governed by law. 
What would it be like for law to exist in a society which does not have a concept of law? 
It would mean that they would not think of its law as law. It is true that we have law and that we 
think of it as law. But is it not possible for a society which has a legal system not to be aware of it 
as a legal system? I will argue that it is. 
 This means that in legal theory there is a tension between the parochial and the universal. 
It is both parochial and universal. On the one hand it is parochial, for it aims to explain an 
institution designated by a concept that is a local concept, a product of modern western 
civilisation. On the other hand it is universal theory for it applies to law whenever and wherever it 
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can conceivably be, and its existence does not presuppose the existence of its concept, indeed it 
does not presuppose the existence of any legal concept. 
H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, argued that it is necessary for a satisfactory account 
of law to explain how the law is perceived and understood by the people who live under it. To use 
his terminology - which in general I will avoid as it is open to diverse and confusing 
interpretations - he argued that a legal system cannot exist in a country unless at least part of its 
population has an internal attitude to the law, regards the law from the internal point of view, or 
accepts the law as a guide to its behaviour - these being alternative descriptions of the same 
attitude. This claim of Hart, perhaps the central claim of his theory of law, has since been widely 
accepted. But its meaning is much in dispute. I think that Hart was right to insist that it is in the 
nature of law that in general its existence is known to those subject to it, and that normally it 
plays a role in their life. 
 I say “normally” for it is of course possible for people to disregard the law, to be 
mindless of its existence. But that condition is abnormal not only, if at all, in being rare. It is 
abnormal because it is of the essence of law that it expects people to be aware of its existence and, 
when appropriate, to be guided by it. They may not be. But that marks a failure in the law. It 
shows that it is not functioning as it aspires to function. 
I find nothing amiss in personalising the law, as I just did in the previous paragraph. We 
do refer to the law as imposing requirements and duties, conferring rights and privileges and so 
on. Such expressions are unexceptional. The law’s actions, expectations and intentions are its in 
virtue of the actions, expectations and intentions of the people who hold legal office according to 
law, that is, we know when and how the actions, intentions and attitudes of judges, legislators and 
other legal officials, when acting as legal officials, are to be seen as the actions, intentions and 
expectations of the law. They, acting as officials, express the demand and the expectation that 
people be aware of the law and that they be guided by it. 
Hart in describing the internal attitude which legal officials necessarily have, and which 
others are expected to have, strove to identify only those aspects of their attitude to the law which 
are essential to its existence. He saw no conflict between the fact that officials and others in every 
society with law adopt the internal point of view towards the law and the universal character of 
the law. And in a way he was right. There is no contradiction between the two. But I think that  
while his views are compatible with my emphasis on the parochial nature of the concept of law he 
was unaware of these implications. 
The question is: does people’s awareness of rules of law mean an awareness of them as 
rules or an awareness of them as rules of law? Need they, in other words, possess the concept of 
law in order to be members of a political community governed by law? Hart assumed, and surely 
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he was right, that in our cultures the concept of law is available to all, that most people have a 
fairly good general grasp of it. He has identified certain features as the uncontroversial core of the 
common understanding of the concept of law. His own account of the concept merely deepens 
our understanding by drawing out some of the implications of the concept as it is commonly 
understood, the concept of law as we have it.  
But our possession of the concept is logically independent of the fact that we live in a 
political community governed by law. We could have had the same concept had we lived in a 
state of nature. We might then have used the concept to understand the difference between the 
law-free society we inhabit and the condition of other countries which do live under legal 
systems, and the difference between the current state of our society and what it might have been 
or may become. Contrariwise it would seem that Hart is not committed to the view that to live in 
a society governed by law we need be aware of the concept of law, beyond an awareness of the 
rules which in fact constitute the law of our society.  
By way of contrast Dworkin’s theory of law assumes that an awareness of the concept of 
law is necessary for the existence of law in any society. For him the law is an interpretive practice 
which exists only in societies which are aware of the nature of that practice and of its interpretive 
character, and thus possess the concept of law.1 In this, however, Hart’s position is the correct 
one. Our concept of law does not make an awareness of it in a society a precondition of that 
society being governed by law. I will illustrate this point with one example only. 
Jewish religious rules and practices are rich and diverse. They did, at an earlier stage of 
their development, govern the life of independent Jewish communities, and, in more recent times, 
they governed many aspects of life in Jewish communities in many parts of the world. Whenever 
theocratic autonomous Jewish communities existed or may exist they would be subject to law, i.e. 
Jewish religious law. But the concept of law is not part of the Jewish religion, and where such 
communities existed in the past they often existed in societies whose members did not possess the 
concept of law. Jewish religious thought and doctrine encompasses much more than law. It 
encompasses what we regard as comprehensive systems of law, ethics and religion, areas which 
though overlapping are also, in our eyes, distinct. To the Orthodox Jew of old there is no division 
within Judaic doctrines which captures the divisions indicated by “our” concepts of law, religion 
and ethics. Yet beyond doubt theocratic Jewish communities did have a legal system even though 
                                                     
1 Though it is possible that all his theory requires is that those living in a society subject to law 
regard the law as instantiating some interpretive concept or another rather than the concept of law 
specifically. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 21 
J. Raz, Can There be a Theory of Law?  
they lacked the concept of law, or at any rate some of them (those which had not learnt it from 
other cultures) lacked it. 
I believe that much the same is true of some other religious systems. “Our” concept of 
law is probably alien to the culture of Islamic theocracies, but it would be absurd to think that 
Iran, e.g., does not have a legal system, or that its having a legal system depends on Iranians 
having acquired the concept of law before their Islamic revolution, or through their acquaintance 
with the law of other countries. Rather, the correct conclusion is that while the concept of law is 
itself a product of a specific culture, a concept which was not available to members of earlier 
cultures, this does not show that those cultures did not have law. The existence of law requires 
awareness by (at least some) members of the society of being guided by rules, awareness of 
disputes regarding the meaning of the rules, and regarding claims that they have been breached, 
being subject to adjudication by human institutions, and - in many, though not necessarily all 
cases - awareness that the rules, or some of them, are the product of deliberate rule-creation by 
some people or institutions. But none of these features is unique to the law. They are shared by it 
and many other social structures, such as religions, trade unions, and a variety of associations of 
many kinds. Therefore, awareness of these features does not presuppose awareness of them as 
aspects of a legal system. And there is nothing else in the concept of law which requires that 
people be aware of their institutional structure as a legal system in order for their institutions to 
constitute a legal system. Notice, however, that there is a discrepancy between my use of the 
example of Jewish Religious law and the more abstract argument I provided. The argument 
rejected the second premise mentioned on p. 19, that is the premise that law can exist only in a 
society which has some concept of law, on the ground that (a) the correct proposition that law can 
exist only in a society in which at least part of the population accepts its rules and is guided by it 
does not yield the second premise as a conclusion; and (b) that the example of Jewish law shows 
that our concept of law does apply to legal systems which do not have our concept of law. The 
example is not sufficient by itself to show that our concept of law identifies as legal systems 
practices existing in societies which had no concept of law whatsoever. That would be more 
difficult to show by example. The case rests on the absence of a reason to think otherwise, given 
the rest of the argument. 
We can therefore conclude that the charge, or the ready admission, that a theory of law 
must be parochial, for it can apply only to countries which possess our concept of law, or to 
countries which possess some concept of law, is mistaken. The law can and does exist in cultures 
which do not think of their legal institutions as legal, and a theory of law aims to give an account 
of the law wherever it is found, including in societies which do not possess the concept of law. 
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6. On the Alleged Impossibility of Understanding Alien Cultures 
I have argued that while the concept of law is parochial, legal theory is not. Legal theory 
can only grow in cultures which have the concept of law. But its conclusions, if valid at all, apply 
to all legal systems, including those, and there are such, which obtain in societies which do not 
have the concept of law. 
This conclusion has been criticised from a slightly different direction. The fact that 
concepts emerge within a culture at a particular juncture is often seen as a vindication of some 
radical philosophical thesis such as relativism, or post-modernism or ethnocentrism. In particular 
it is taken to show our principled inability to understand, or at any rate to understand completely, 
alien cultures. In fact it shows little, certainly not that concepts can only apply to phenomena 
which exist in cultures which have those concepts. Consider, e.g., the notion of  “the standard of 
living”. It may well not have been available to people in medieval Europe. But there is nothing in 
this fact to invalidate discussions of the effect of the Wars of the Roses on the standard of living 
in Lancashire. People would enjoy the same standard of living whether or not they were aware of 
the notion, or of the measurement of their own standard of living. The same is true of many other 
economic notions.  
Some concepts are different. Arguably since gifts are gifts only if intentionally given as 
such there cannot be gifts among people who do not possess the concept of a gift. As we saw 
something like this is true of rules. People are not guided by rules unless they are aware of them 
as rules. But, and that is the crucial point, they need not be aware of rules as legal rules in order to 
be guided by rules which are in fact legal.  
On reflection there is nothing surprising in this. Of crucial importance is the fact that 
concepts like that of the law are essential not only to our understanding of the practices and 
institutions of our own societies, but also to our understanding of other societies. In our attempts 
to understand societies with cultures radically different from ours we encounter a conflict. On the 
one hand to understand other societies we must master their concepts, for we will not understand 
them unless we understand how they perceive themselves. But, on the other hand, we cannot 
understand other cultures unless we can relate their practices and customs to our own. Their 
concepts will not be understood by us unless we can relate them to our own concepts. How can 
this conflict be resolved? It seems to land us in an impasse which forces us to admit the 
impossibility of truly or completely understanding alien cultures. 
This pessimism is, however, unjustified. We can meet both conditions for understanding 
alien cultures. While there may be a tension between the need to understand them in terms of 
some of our concepts, even though they do not have those concepts, and the need to understand 
how they understand themselves, i.e. in terms of concepts which we do not have, there is no 
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contradiction here. Both conditions can be fully met. Far from being irreconcilable they are 
interdependent. That is, the understanding of alien cultures requires possession of concepts which 
apply across the divide between us and them, concepts which can be applied to the practices of 
other cultures as well as to our own. Reliance on such concepts is necessary to make the alien 
cultures intelligible to us. They are required to enable us better to understand their concepts which 
we do not share. 
Let us examine the argument to the contrary, the pessimistic argument. The fact that some 
cultures do not possess all of our concepts, and that they possess concepts which we do not have, 
makes them alien. If we need to rely on concepts which they do not possess in our attempt to 
understand them, as we commonly do, then our attempts are doomed to failure. They fail, the 
argument goes, to satisfy the other condition of understanding a culture, that is that one must 
understand how its members understood themselves. This condition requires, so the argument 
continues, understanding the alien culture from inside, that is using only concepts which were 
available to its members, only concepts that they used in understanding themselves.  
Where does the pessimistic argument go wrong? It overlooks the ways in which we 
acquire many of the concepts that we muster. Concept acquisition often results from a 
combination of establishing, through explicit explanation or by observing how they are used by 
others, relations between them and other familiar concepts on the one hand, and learning their use 
by osmosis, by using them or observing their use, being set right by others when one makes a 
mistake, or, more commonly, observing through the reactions of others that one’s use of the 
concept was not altogether happy. Let us call those two ways, often inter-related and not clearly 
distinguished in practice, learning by definition and learning through imitation. It is sometimes 
thought that some concepts are learnt one way and some another. Colour concepts are thought to 
be examples of concepts acquired by imitation, by ostension. Mathematical concepts, and 
generally abstract concepts are thought to be learnt through definitions. In fact it is reasonable to 
suppose that all our concepts which have use outside narrowly delimited groups of users and 
purposes of use1 are learnt through a combination of both methods. To acquire the concept of red 
one needs to know that it is a colour concept, that it is a perceptual concept, that nothing can be 
both red and green all over, and other matters one is likely to learn partly through definitions. To 
acquire the number concept “two” one needs to know that when two drops of water merge there is 
only one drop of water there, and to have other knowledge likely to be acquired partly by 
imitation. 
                                                     
1 Such as the names of widgets in the building trade. Or some theoretical terms in science 
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I am not arguing that any single stage in the process of acquiring the concept, like the 
ones I mentioned, depends only one or the other of the two methods. Most, perhaps all, of them 
can succeed through either method. I am saying, however, that it is humanly impossible to 
acquire concepts generally except through a combination of both methods. 
Some people who share these views about concept acquisition may find in them further 
argument for the pessimistic conclusion about our alleged inability to understand alien cultures. 
But this seems to me to overlook the role of imagination and thought experiments in the process 
of learning and understanding. In principle we can understand alien cultures because we can 
acquire their concepts, provided we have a substantial enough body of data to allow learning by 
imitation, either real imitation of one who visits or joins the alien culture, or through imaginative 
and sympathetic engagement with and reflection on reports of the nature of the culture and its 
habits, and other historical data. Naturally the material available about that culture may be 
insufficient. It may leave gaps in our mastery of its concepts and our understanding of its ways. 
But these are practical, not principled, limitations. 
Our understanding of alien cultures will, however, remain incomplete until we can relate 
their concepts to ours. Why is this a necessary condition of understanding? After all, it may well 
be that none of the members of the alien culture understands our culture. If they can understand 
their own culture, as surely they can, without relating it to ours why cannot we do the same? The 
short answer is: because we, unlike them, know and understand our culture. Given our situation 
we cannot understand the alien culture without relating it to ours. Here is an analogy: Native 
French speakers have complete mastery of French, even if they have no knowledge of English. 
But native English speakers, who study French as a foreign language cannot understand it if they 
do not know what “un homme”, “une maison”, “plaisir”, and so on, mean in English.1 
There is an asymmetry here between one’s knowledge of French and one’s knowledge of 
English. Only when the English speakers’ command of French and its relations to English reaches 
very high level of subtlety and expertise, or when it is reflective knowledge leading them to 
reflect about the similarities and the differences between the languages does it becomes 
appropriate to say that their understanding of English is improved by their deep knowledge of 
French. For ordinary English speakers who study French for practical purposes and are not 
inclined to reflect on its nature, no such benefit occurs: That is, their knowledge of French is 
improved by their growing ability to translate French into English. But their knowledge of 
                                                     
1 These are examples, which do not imply that our native English speakers must have a perfect 
ability to translate French into English to qualify as French speakers. Only that they need to have 
some such ability. 
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English is not affected. This asymmetry is the main manifestation of what I will call “the route 
dependence” of understanding in general. We understand new things by relating them to what we 
already understand, even though had we started somewhere else we could have gained an 
understanding of those things without understanding how they relate to what we in fact know. 
Moreover, while in some ways, and under some conditions our newly acquired understanding can 
deepen or improve what we understood already, it need not do so. 
The route-dependence of understanding is sometimes stated by saying that we understand 
whatever we understand from our personal “point of view”. While there is nothing wrong in 
applying this overused expression in this context, it can have unfortunate connotations. For some 
people it carries associations of blinkers, of limitations and distortions. If we can understand alien 
cultures only from our point of view it shows - or so it is alleged - that we do not understand 
them as they really are, that our understanding is imperfect, and distorted. After all, we 
understand the alien cultures through our modern western perspective, relying on our notions and 
on our knowledge of history and of many cultures not known to members of the cultures which 
we are studying. So our understanding of their cultures differs from their own understanding of 
their own cultures, and cannot be altogether objective, or perfect, or something like that. 
The example of a native English speaker acquiring French was meant to disprove that 
thought. To be sure, it is difficult to acquire perfect command of a second language, which is 
learnt after one has acquired one’s first language. But it is possible in principle, and in practice as 
the examples of people like Conrad and Nabokov shows. To master a second language one has to 
relate it to one’s first language, whereas a native speaker of that second language need know no 
other. Nevertheless, in principle both can have perfect command of that language. I have 
explained the fact that while they arrive at the same destination only one of them must, to get 
there, know how what is to him the second language relates to his first by saying that 
understanding (and explanation) are route-dependent. But until we understand why this is so we 
cannot be confident that route-dependence does not affect the possibility of perfect knowledge, or 
its objectivity. This is a topic of another occasion. Let us take stock of the conclusions tentatively 
arrived at so far. 
We have already travelled some way from the goal of establishing the possibility of legal 
theory. That was made necessary because the challenge to the possibility of theory depends on 
assumptions with much wider ramifications. Now we have to travel even further afield. To 
establish the possibility of a theory of law, a theory which explains the nature of law, we need to 
examine some issues concerning the function of explanation. The aim of the examination would 
be to vindicate the conclusion tentatively arrived at in this chapter (at the end of the previous 
section). Namely, that legal theory has universal application, that it - when successful - provides 
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an account of the nature of law, wherever and whenever it is to be found. The objectivity and 
universality of the theory of law is not affected by the fact that the concept of law (which is our 
concept of law) is parochial and not shared by all the people nor by all the cultures, which live or 
lived under the law. 
That conclusion was based on the claim that to understand an alien culture and its 
institutions we need to understand both how its members understand themselves, and how their 
concepts, practices, and institutions relate to ours. This means that to understand alien cultures we 
must have concepts whose application is not limited by the boundaries of our culture, which 
apply to alien cultures as well to our own. I neither have argued nor will argue that our culture has 
the intellectual resources which make it possible, with good will and sympathetic imagination, to 
understand alien cultures. I take it for granted that that is so. I have argued that if we have these 
resources, and if such understanding is possible then the concept of law is one such concept. I 
have argued for that by the use of the example of theocratic societies, and the fact that we apply 
the concept of law to their institutional arrangements. The concept of law is among the culture-
transcending concepts. It is a concept which picks out an institution which exists even in societies 
which do not have such a concept. 
That does not establish that a theory of law is in principle possible, or that if it is possible 
it can achieve objective knowledge, rather than provide a blinkered way of understanding those 
alien cultures, albeit the best understanding which can be achieved from our subjective point of 
view. To positively establish the possibility of a theory of law we need to examine the nature of 
explanation and of objectivity. The reflections here offered do, however, remove some 
misunderstanding which sometimes lead people to doubt the possibility of such a theory. 
